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I.

NATURE OF. THE CASE
Application by Michael E. Wood to the Industrial Commission

of the State of Utah to· recover temporary total disability benefits
for a work-related injury.
II.
DISPOSITTON AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL
Application denied on November 28, 1979; Motion.for
Review denied January 22, 1980.

III.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to set aside the Administrative Law
Judge's denial of benefits.

IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Michael E. Wood, was hired by Respondent,
Thompson Flying Service, (hereinafter "Thompson") on May 11,

1978 as Vice-President of Operations and continued in that
capacity as an employee. until January 22, 1979, earning One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1, 400. 00) per week (R 38, L 6-17) .
On July 29, 19-78, Appellant was injured at about 10:30
o'clock p.m. in a fall from an open vehicle in which he was
riding with the President of Thompson, two (2) co-workers at
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Thompson and a client of Thompson.

The five (5) persons were on

the premises of Appellant's pla.ce of. employment and at a time
of day when it was not uncommon that Ap.p.ellant be engaged in
work-related activities.

The fall causing Appellant's injury

was precipitated by Appellant's losing his balance stepping off
the moving vehicle while trying to avoid having beer poured in
his lap by one of the co-workers (R 42, L 13-19).
Appellant's testimony is clear that [l} he had no "9 to
5" job, but rather was expect.ed to. be available at any time
(R 42, L20-25; R 43, L 1- 7; R 45, L 1-8); [2] he had administrative and public relations duties in which he was engaging at the
time the accident occurred (R 44, L 1-21); [3] he was engaging
in the activities with the company president, two co-workers and
a company client (R 41, L 25; R 42, L 1-4); and [4] the accident
occurred arising out of and di.rectly connected with these
activities (R 42, L 14-19).
Appellant initially secured his position with Thompson because of his status as a professional pilot (R 52, L 22-24) and
it is clear that subsequent to the accident and Appellant's
forced termination on January 22, 1979, Appellant was unable to
resume any employment in that he was unable to secure a first·class medical certificate (R 47, L25; R 48, L 4).
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v.
ARGUMENT
1.

This Court has the Power to Accord the Ruling

Requested by the Appellant.
It is clear under the provisions of 35-1-84 Utah Code
Annotated (1953) that this C.ourt may set aside any award of the
Industrial Commission on either of the following grounds:
(1)

That the Commission acted without
or in excess of its powers;

(2)

That the findings of fact do not
support the award.

Appellant contends that the Administrative Law Judge
misapplied the law to the facts of this case and that such act
was an abuse of disc·retion and outside the Judge's power and/or
constitutes grounds under Section 2 above to set aside on the
basis that the evidence so adduced when appl.ied to the law, was
insufficient to justify the award.
That the requested inquiry and relief is within the scope
of the Court's power to grant is clearly set forth in two early
cases decided by this Court.

In Bingham Mines Company vs. Allsop,

203 P. 644 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court, in commenting on the

appropriate scope of review in an Indus·trial Commission case.
stated at 645:
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. . . the question whether the.re is any substantial evidence ·to support an award is a
question of law.
A year later the Court ob.served as follows on the same issue
in the case of Cudahy·

P"~~cking

Go.·, of Nebraska: vs. B·roW'n, 210

P. 608, 610 (1922):
. . . the legal effect of the. evidence produced is a question of law which it is the duty
of this court to de~ide.
It is in accordance with and wi.thin these. guidelines that
Appellant seeks the annulment of the failure of the Industrial
Commission to accord the benefits sought.
2.

The Administrative Law 'Judge Misapplied the Legal

Standards to the Facts of this Gase.
A.

Utah case law was !lot c·orrectly appli:ed to

the facts of this case.
Appellant argues that the Morley. vs. Industrial Commission,

459 P.2d 212 (

) , case upon which the Administrative Law Judge

relied cannot be controlling here because of the great disparity
of facts between Morley, and t.he instant case and further argues
that the standards alluded to by the Administrative Law Judge in
Larson on Workmen's Compensation very clearly support Appellant's
claim for relief.

Thus, Appellant urges that the question here is

one legal in nature, i.e., a misapplication of law, and one which
is therefore subject to review in this Court.
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The legal standard relating to "course of employment" has
been before this Court more than several times in the past.

In

the case of Twin Peaks Canning Co., vs. Industrial Gonnnission,
196 P. 853 (1921), this Court allowed recovery of benefits to
the mother o.f a fourteen (14) year old child killed [ l] during
a work day [2] while playing on an elevator, [3] which had
nothing to do with his job, and [4] from which the child had
been specifically warned to stay away.

The Court held, in per-

tinent part, at 858:
. . . the mere fact that the injured employee
at the time of the acci.dent, was not in the
discharge of his usual duties or was not
directly engaged in anything connected with
those duties, does not necessarily prevent him
from recovering compensation in case of accidential injury. In that connection it must
be remembered that, while a human being may do
no more than what a machine might do, yet he
cannot be classed as a machi.ne merely. If
during his working hours there are intervals of
leisure, he may, during such intervals, within
reasonable limits, move from place to place on
the premises of the employer in case he refrains
from exposing himself voluntarily to known or
visible hazards or dangers. In moving about
as aforesaid he may also have social intercourse
with his co-employees, and within reasonable
limits may "visit" with them. In doing these
things within the bounds of reasons, the employee does not go outside of the course of
his employment. (Emphasis added.)

-5-
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This very broad standard was again recognized in M & K
Corp. , vs. Industrial Gommiss;ion, 189 P.. 2d 132 (1948) where this
Court allowed recovery to the widow o~ a de.ceased employee who was
killed in a truck roll.over even though the dece.dent' s unlicensed
fourteen (14) year old son was ·driving the 10-wheel truck, with
decedent's permission, at the time of the accident:

In regard

to this "course of employmen:tn question, the Court observed at
134 that it refers to:
. . the time, place, and. circumstances under
which [an accident] occurred . . . .
The Court further indicated at 134 that:
We have also rep·eatedly held that this
statute should be liberally construed and if
there is any doubt respecting the right to
compensation it should be reso1ved in favor
of recovery.
And further, indicating the breadth of the application of the
statute, indicated, also at 134:
In other words, the requirement that the
accident arise in the course of the employment
is satisfied if it occurs while the employee
is rendering service to his employer which he
was hired to do or doing something.incidental
thereto, at the time when and the place where
he was authorized to render such service.
In each of these situations the "horseplay" or extent of
deviation from employment was substantial, yet recovery was allowed.
However, in the instant case recovery was denied in a situation
where the "horseplay" or deviation, if in fact there was any, was
miniscule.

Therefore, the legal standard has been misapprehended
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or misapplied, and as such is
Mo~ley,

sub~ect

to review.

In regard to

and the application thereof under this case, it seems

extremely clear that those principles cannot apply to the facts
of this case in any meaningful or justifiable fashion.

In the case

of Morley it was clear that Morley's activity at the time of the
accident was not rationally related to his normal employment as
a carpenter and that Morley was nowhere near his place of employment at the time of the accident.

Further, in the Morley case,

there were no co-workers, clients or other persons connected with
Mr. Morley's business· with Mr. Morley

~t

the time of the accident.

However, such is not the case in Appellant's situation.

Not

only was Appellant engaged in an activity with his b0ss and two
co-workers, but with a client to whom Appellant had some responsibility (R 44, L 1-18).

Further, Appellant was on the premises

of his job at a time when it was connnon for him to be on the job
and under c·ircumstances where he had remained at the job during
the entire day and was still there at the time of the accident.
Thus, the facts of this case do not in any manner whatsoever
.parallel those of the Morley case, and the·ir application to
the standards set forth in that case is. entirely unjustified.
B.

Non-case law standards relied upon by the

Adminis·trative Law Judge have not been correctly applied
to the instant facts.
The Administrative Law Judge appl.ied standards set forth in
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Larson on Workmen's Compensation and concluded that the facts of
this case fell outside the area c·ircum.scribed by this authority
within which compensation would be allowed.
First, the Administrative Law Judge found that Appellant
deviated from the course of his employment so seriously that
recovery of any compensation is. unjustified.

Gertainly, it is

clear from the record that Appellant's actions were not a deviation of any consequence, if indeed his actions constituted a
deviation at all.

The fact that Appellant was at the place of his

business, had reniai.ned at the place of business during the entire
day and was still there, that he was with his boss and two other
co-employees and a cl.ient all indicate that any deviation from
the course of Appellant's. employment was minuscule at most.
Neither can it be found that the facts of this case justify the
refusal to award Appellant berief its under the second criterion
discuss·ed by Larson.

As.suming for purpose·s of argument that

there was a deviation from a course of his employment by Appellant
c·ertainly the deviation was not complete and in any event was comingled with the performance of his duty and can in no way be construed to be an abandonment of that duty.

Under the third cri-

terion set forth by Larson, the Administrative Law Judge has construed from the .record that the activities innnediately preceding
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the accident were not an accepted part of the employment.

Cer-

tainly the fact that Appellant's boss was present just prior to
the accident and that if his boss had not ordered the beer himself, he at lease acquiesced in its acquisition, indicates that
the general activities engaged in we.re an accepted or acceptable
part of the employment.

This position further supports Appellant's

argument against the position taken by the Administrative Law
Judge under the fourth criterion of Larson, i.e., the extent to
which the nature of the employemnt may be expected to include some
such horseplay.

With the President of Appellant's employer

present as well as other high level employees, it can hardly
be concluded, nor should it be, that no horseplay was to be expected under the circumstances of that situation.
C.

There is insubstantial evidence to support

certain findings of fact by the Administrative Law Judge.
The ultimate issue of fact which Appellant claims was
incorrectly deduced by the Administrative Law Judge is whether
of not Appellant was engaged in an activity which constituted a
deviation from his course of employment sufficient under current
Utah law to deprive Appellant of benefits under Workmen's Compensation statutes.

The recitation of facts by the Administrative

Law Judge (R 77-79) is substantially correct, although at least
one salient fact has been overlooked.

Appellant testified (R 42,

L 1-4) that Wayne Wienecke, who was the owner of Thompson's Flying

-9-
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Service, Appellant's. employer, was also present at the time of the
accident.

Thus, it seems pertinent that p.re.sent were a co-worker

of Appellant, Barry Hansen, another co-worker, Jim Powers, the
President of Thompson Flying Service and Jim Hunt, a client of
Thompson Flying Se.rvice.

Thus,· the.re were five (5) people

present, including Appellant, and of that total five, four
were off i.c·ers and/or emplo.yees of Thompson Flying Service and
one of five was a client ·of Thompson Flying Service.

(See

also R 42, L 14-19.)
VI . .

GONCLUSTON
There can be no doubt that this Court has the power to
grant the relief s.ought. by Appellant, and good arguments exist
for doing so, as Appellant. has heretofore se·t forth.

But there

is at least one other reason, and that is to turn the tide
at the administrative level and to keep the Indus·trial Commission from assuming t.he posture of an entity t.he very reason for
the existence of which is to seek to. avoid compensating injured employees if any reason whatsoever, no matter how slight,
may be found for doing so.

The administrative posture should be

in nature more willing to compensate. and rather than seeking to
avoid ways to accord monetary relief, should seek to find and
identify within the law and facts of each individual case ways
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to give relief if justified.

Certainly there is great motiva-

tion on the part of employers to fight such a trend, inasmuch
as a lack of recoveries equals lower insurance rates for them.
However, the fact of lower insurance rates flowing from fewer
recoveries also tends to lower the employers' motivation to
maintain safe working conditions, a result certainly less than
desirable.
In the inst·ant case Appellant respectfully requests the
Court to accord the relief hereinabove requested.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

28th day of April, 1980.

W. GUYON,
INSON, GUYON,

~J.-~-~

1220 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was served upon Timothy C.
Houpt, attorney for Respondents Thompson Flying Service and
State Insurance Fund, by mailing, postage prepaid, the same

'
this 28th day of April,
1980 to him at Suite 500 Ten West
Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
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